Mbiti and Current Issues in African Philosophy by Okeja, Uchenna
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
The Journal of Traditions & Beliefs Michael Schwartz Library
2016
Mbiti and Current Issues in African Philosophy
Uchenna Okeja
The University of Frankfurt
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/jtb
Part of the African American Studies Commons, African Languages and Societies Commons,
Continental Philosophy Commons, History of Religion Commons, Oral History Commons, Other
Languages, Societies, and Cultures Commons, Other Religion Commons, and the Social History
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michael Schwartz Library at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in The Journal of Traditions & Beliefs by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Okeja, Uchenna (2016) "Mbiti and Current Issues in African Philosophy," The Journal of Traditions & Beliefs: Vol. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/jtb/vol2/iss1/5
	 Most	of	the	issues	discussed	in	contemporary	African	philosophy	have	their	origin	in	the	seminal	ideas	of	the	pioneers	in	the	field	of	African	thought.	John	S.	Mbiti	is	one	such	pioneer.		His	works	have	influenced	the	intellectual	inquiry	into	African	modes	of	life	and	experience,	and	his	1970	landmark	publication	of	the	book,	African	Religions	and	Philosophy,1	was	a	trailblazer	in	the	field.	In	this	publication,	Mbiti	attempted	to	show	his	readers	the	nature	of	African	religions	and	philosophy;	that	is,	to	account	for	the	totality	of	the	African	worldview.	This	was	very	ambitious,	and	his	contribution	to	these	two	fields	of	inquiry	has	earned	him	a	place	in	the	annals	of	history	of	African	scholars.	To	be	sure,	it	would	be	too	vague,	if	not	implausible,	to	credit	Mbiti	with	so	much	without	recourse	to	concrete	examples	of	his	contributions.	It	is	necessary,	for	reasons	of	clarity,	to	point	out	the	major	innovations	Mbiti	brought	to	the	study	of	the	African	mode	of	life	and	experience	through	his	magnum	opus	mentioned	above.	To	arrive	at	such	specifics,	the	scene	of	current	issues	in	African	philosophy	will	be	an	apt	example.	In	this	context,	discussions	of	the	African	concept	of	morality	best	exemplify	the	import	of	Mbiti’s	book.		Contemporary	African	philosophers	concern	themselves	in	one	way	or	the	other	with	reflection	on	the	meaning	of	life	and	how	best	to	live	it.	In	this	reflection,	the	question	of	ethics,	which	is	the	question	of	how	to	live	the	best	possible	life,	and	metaphysics,	which	is	the	question	of	what	lies	beyond	the	physical	and	observable	reality,	become	inevitable.	In	their	articulation	of	the	foundations	of	the	African	concept	of	morality,	African	philosophers	have	developed	divergent	opinions	which,	when	put	in	perspective,	reveal	the	deep	impact	of	Mbiti’s	work.	Some	have	suggested	a	religious	foundation	for	the	African	concept	of	morality,	while	others	deny	such	claims,	insisting	instead	that	the	African	concept	of	morality	is	based	on	considerations	of	human	welfare	and	practical	concerns	of	how	to	ensure	harmony	in	the	community.	While	the	influence	of	Mbiti	on	the	arguments	of	the	first	group	(those	who	insist	that	African	concept	of	morality	is	based	on	a	religious	foundation)	is	obvious,	since	it	is	Mbiti	who	postulated	a	religious	universe	for	the	Africans,	the	connection	of	the	second	group	to	Mbiti	lies	in	their	use	of	the	thesis	of	the	first	group	in	their	counter-argument.		Philosophers	like	Sophie	Oluwole,2	Kwasi	Wiredu,3	and	Kwame	Gyekye4	have	shown	in	their	philosophical	works	that	the	foundation	of	the	African	concept	of	morality	cannot	be	plausibly	based	on	religion,	while	others	like	Akin	Makinde	have	viewed	the	African	concept	of	morality	to	be	solely	based	on	a	religious	foundation.	Building	his	thoughts	around	the	concept	of	the	religious	universe	that	Mbiti	sees	the	African	as	living	in,	Makinde	notes,			 Mbiti’s	finding	is	quite	tenable	in	the	light	of	African	traditions	and	cultures	and	my	(his)	own	African	experience	.	.	.	Taking	the	view	of	these	researchers	as	a	tenable	hypothesis,	some	other	hypotheses	consistent	with	it	can	be	derived	as	consequences.	First,	we	can	derive	from	it	the	view	that	religion	plays	a	great	role	in	the	lives	of	African	peoples.	Perhaps	a	more	general	deduction	from	this	is	that	since,	according	to	Mbiti,	the	Africans	live	in	a	religious	universe,	then,	all	their	[sic]	activities	must	be	influenced	by	one	kind	of	religion	or	the	other.	From	this	it	can	be	more	specifically	stated	that	an	African	system	of	morality,	based	on	African	cultural	beliefs,	must	have	a	religious	foundation.	This	claim	is	perfectly	consistent	with	the	idea	of	an	African	religious	universe.5		
                                                1	John	S.	Mbiti,	African	Religions	and	Philosophy	(New	York:	Frederick	A.	Praeger	Publishers,	1970).	 2	Sophie	Oluwole,	“The	Rational	Basis	of	Yoruba	Ethical	Thinking,”	The	Nigerian	Journal	of	
Philosophy	4-5,	(1984-1985),	14-25.		3	Kwasi	Wiredu,	“Morality	and	Religion	in	Akan	Thought,”	in	Philosophy	and	Cultures,	ed.	Odera	Oruka	and	Dismas	Masolo	(Nairobi:	1983),	6-14.	4	Kwame	Gyekye,	“Philosophical	Ideas	of	the	Akan,”"	Second	Order:	An	African	Journal	of	
Philosophy	10,	nos.	1-2	(1981),	61-79.		 5	Akin	Moses	Makinde,	“African	Culture	and	Moral	Systems:	A	Philosophical	Study,”	Second	Order:	
An	African	Journal	of	Philosophy	1,	no.	2	(1988),	2.	
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 Kwasi	Wiredu	and	some	other	philosophers	have,	on	the	other	hand,	come	up	with	a	different	concept	of	the	foundation	of	African	morality.	Wiredu	not	only	questions	the	adequacy	of	applying	the	conceptual	category	religion	to	any	aspect	of	African	life	and	thought,	but	also	insists	that	it	has	been	suggested,	even	by	some	authors	by	whose	reckoning	of	African	life	is	full	of	religion,	that	there	is	no	word	in	many	African	languages	that	translates	the	word	“religion.”	Elucidating	further	on	this	point,	Wiredu	noted	that	he	does	not	know	whether	this	is	true	of	all	African	languages,	but	that	it	is	certainly	true	of	the	Akans,	at	least	in	the	traditional	use	of	that	language.	There	is,	for	Wiredu,	neither	a	single	word	for	religion	in	this	context	nor	a	periphrastic	equivalent.6	This	presents	the	consequence	that	the	Akan	conception	of	morality	is	neither	logically	nor	even	psychologically	based	on	a	belief	in	the	Supreme	Being.	Being	good	in	the	highest,	the	Supreme	Being	disapproves	of	evil;	but	to	the	Akan	mind,	the	reason	why	people	should	not	do	evil	is	not	because	He	disapproves	of	it	but	rather	because	it	is	contrary	to	human	well	being,	which	is	why	He	disapproves	of	it	in	the	first	place.7		From	the	foregoing	opposing	conceptualizations	of	the	foundation	of	the	African	concept	of	morality,	one	readily	sees	the	influence	of	the	work	of	John	S.	Mbiti.	This	is	so	because	his	postulation	of	a	religious	universe	serves	as	the	seminal	ground	out	of	which	the	two	perspectives	articulated	on	the	foundation	of	the	African	concept	of	morality	grew.	Although	the	concern	here	is	not	to	attempt	reconciliation	of	the	two	positions	but	rather	to	point	them	out,	it	is	pertinent	to	highlight	a	few	issues	that	are	inevitable	in	this	context.	The	claims	of	the	view	that	the	African	concept	of	morality	is	based	on	a	religious	foundation,	which	is	in	accordance	with	Mbiti’s	African	religious	universe,	is	far	from	being	without	problems.	For,	apart	from	the	fact	that	the	argument	is	invalidated	very	easily	by	pointing	out	a	single	instance	of	a	group	of	Africans	who	do	not	base	their	conception	of	morality	on	religion,	the	argument	seems	to	discount	human	experience	(common	sense)	as	a	source	of	moral	knowledge.	It	suffices	to	note	here	that	the	main	problem	with	the	postulation	of	a	religious	foundation	for	the	African	concept	of	morality	is	problematic	and	probably	implausible,	because	the	claim	would	mean	that	without	religion,	Africans	are	incapable	of	knowing	and	differentiating	between	good	and	bad.	To	see	how	implausible	this	claim	is,	one	needs	not	look	far.	One	only	needs	to	call	to	mind	the	fact	that	experience	is,	if	not	the	best	teacher,	a	good	source	of	all	kinds	of	knowledge,	moral	knowledge	included.	If	a	person	hits	his	or	her	head	on	a	door	lintel	while	entering	the	house	today,	he	or	she	will	be	more	careful	tomorrow	to	avoid	repeating	the	same	scenario.	This	exemplifies	the	role	of	common	sense	and	experience	in	the	formulation	of	any	system	of	morals.		
                                                6	Kwasi	Wiredu,	Cultural	Universals	and	Particulars:	An	African	Perspective	(Bloomington,	Indiana	University	Press,	1996),	45.	7	Ibid.,	46.	
2
The Journal of Traditions & Beliefs, Vol. 2 [2016], Art. 5
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/jtb/vol2/iss1/5
